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Abstract
In contrast to the widely recognized importance of exchange rate regimes, evidence on their
effect on business cycle synchronization focuses almost exclusively on the role of currency
unions, thus implicitly ignoring potential effect of other exchange rate regimes. In this
paper we use a new dataset on bilateral de-facto exchange rate regimes for the period 1973-
2016 to study the effect of seven types of regimes on business cycle synchronization. Using
the Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) methodology, we find that the exchange rate regime
is a robust determinant of business cycle synchronization. Compared to country pairs
with freely floating arrangements, we find that: (i) the correlation coefficient measuring
business cycle synchronization is higher by around 0.12 points in countries with no separate
legal tenders; (ii) other hard pegs such as currency board arrangements and de-facto pegs
have also significantly more synchronised business cycles, but the size of the correlation
coefficient is halved compared to countries with no separate legal tenders; (iii) the effect
is not always linearly decreasing with the increasing exchange rate regime flexibility, since
crawling pegs and crawling bands turn out to be insignificant, whereas the effect of moving
bands as a more flexible type of exchange rate regimes is positive and significant; (iv) the
effect is stronger for countries with high degree of financial openness and good institutional
quality.
Keywords: Exchange rate regimes · Currency unions ·
Business cycles synchronization
JEL codes: E32, E52, F33, F42
1 Introduction
Exchange rate regimes have been shown to significantly affect international trade, foreign direct
investment, economic growth and other macroeconomic variables.1 Although many studies have
also investigated the effect of currency unions on business cycles synchronization, the empirical
evidence on the potential effect of remaining exchange rate regimes remains scarce. In this paper
we argue that the seemingly exaggerated focus on currency unions arises due to the difficulty
with proper identification of bilateral exchange rate regimes other than currency unions. The
traditional unilateral exchange rate regimes classifications are suitable to analyse unilateral
∗Goethe University Frankfurt, House of Finance, 60323 Frankfurt, Germany, e-mail: jiaberylhou@gmail.com.
†Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Jakob-Welder-
Weg 4, 55128 Mainz, Germany, phone: + 49-6131-39-25140, e-mail: jakub.knaze@uni-mainz.de.
‡We are indebted to audiences at the 2019 Goettingen workshop on International Economics as well as
seminar participants at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz for helpful comments.
1See for example Klein and Shambaugh (2006) for the effect of exchange rate regimes on international trade,
Harms and Knaze (2018) for the effect on FDI or Ghosh et al. (2014) for the effect on inflation. Further, exchange
rate regimes have been found to significantly affect GDP growth (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003), terms
of trade (Broda, 2004) or other policy variables (e.g. Obstfeld et al., 2005, on monetary policy).
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outcome variables, but they are not suitable for bilateral outcome variables such as business
cycles synchronization.
In this paper we use the new dataset on bilateral de-facto exchange rate regimes constructed
by Harms and Knaze (2018), which allows us to analyse the effect of exchange rate regimes on
business cycle synchronization over the past 44 years. Thus, we investigate the effect various
exchange rate regimes - rather than just currency unions - have on business cycle synchroniza-
tion. Various theoretical models indicate different channels through which the exchange rate
regimes might matter for business cycle synchronization. The models’ predictions on the direc-
tion of the effect usually depend on the interaction of exchange rate regimes with other policy
variables. For example, one implication from the classical Mundell-Flemming model (Fleming,
1962; Mundell, 1963) is that exchange rate regimes strengthen or neutralise the effects of mon-
etary and fiscal policies aimed at income and employment stabilisation. The overall strength
of the effect, and how this effect is transmitted across countries, depends on which type of the
underlying shocks is more pronounced.
There are also potential indirect channels through other variables by which exchange rate
regimes can affect business cycle synchronization. For example, less flexible regimes are ex-
pected to foster a higher degree of financial integration (McKinnon, 2004) or more trade be-
tween countries (Klein and Shambaugh, 2006). Through these indirect channels, exchange rate
regimes are expected to influence the degree of synchronization between countries. To analyse
the effect of the exchange rate regimes seems thus of high policy relevance. If the exchange rate
regimes insulate or amplify effects of various policy tools, one must be careful when analysing
the effects of various policy variables.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effect of exchange
rate regimes on business cycle synchronization. We follow Inklaar et al. (2008) and conduct
the Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) as proposed by Leamer (1983) and modified by Sala-I-
Martin (1997) as our main empirical strategy. The method allows us to address potential bias
caused by omitted variables. The basic idea of EBA is to run a set of multiple regressions
at once. Among this set of regressions, all possible combinations of potential determinants
for a given outcome variable are tested to find EBA-robust determinants of the dependent
variable. We collect data on 38 different variables as potential determinants of business cycle
synchronization as mentioned by previous literature. We run several thousand regressions with
all possible combinations of all 38 variables to obtain the “robust” determinants of business
cycle synchronization.
In further analysis, we employ OLS by including all EBA-robust variables. To ensure that
our empirical evidence is not sensitive to biases caused by measurement errors or empirical
specifications, we run several robustness tests. For example, our investigation uses 5 distinctive
correlation periods, with the exchange rate regime measured both at the beginning and middle
of each respective period to make sure that the results are not driven by changes in the exchange
rate regimes within periods. Importantly, our results remain robust to the use of both de-facto
and de-jure regime classifications.
Also, country and country-time fixed effects are used to control for any unobserved hetero-
geneity. Given that the exchange rate regimes change only slowly, Klein and Shambaugh (2010)
argue that using country or country-pair fixed effects seems to address adequately concerns with
endogeneity. Importantly, we address the potential reverse causality problem concerning the
choice of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization by including only country
pairs that are linked indirectly through a common anchor currency. These tests should account
for the fact that countries might decide on adoption of the exchange rate regime based on high
degree of trade intensity, financial integration or observed business cycle co-movement.
Our empirical investigation provides evidence that less flexible regimes are associated with
more synchronised business cycles, but the magnitude of the coefficients varies depending on
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the individual regime type. More specifically, country pairs with no separate legal tenders
are associated with a correlation coefficient of business cycle synchronization higher by around
0.12 points, compared to country pairs with freely floating regimes. Thus, no separate legal
tenders are indeed significantly, positively related to business cycle correlation when considered
in isolation. This effect is stronger for participants of a currency union, as compared to the case
when a foreign currency circulates as the sole legal tender. We also find strong positive effects
for other regimes with low exchange rate flexibility, such as currency board arrangements and
de-facto pegs. When moving to the more flexible regimes, we find that the effect for country
pairs with soft pegs is more heterogeneous. Comparing to the most flexible (freely floating)
regimes, crawling pegs and crawling bands turn out to be insignificant. However, moving bands
are found to be positive and significant, although they are more flexible than crawling bands.
Overall, our results imply that there is no regime having less synchronised business cycles than
the country pairs with freely floating regimes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the previous empirical
findings and summarizes relevant theories on the role of exchange rate regimes for business cycle
synchronization. Section 3 describes the data and outlines our empirical methodology. Section
4 reports the benchmark results on the effect of bilateral exchange rate regimes on business cycle
synchronization. Section 5 investigates the robustness of the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Our study is nested in the literature of determinants of business cycle synchronization and it
is closest to the study of Inklaar et al. (2008), which investigates an exhaustive set of possible
determinants of business cycle synchronization among 21 OECD countries for the period 1970-
2003. The relevant determinants of business cycle synchronization such as trade intensity, trade
specialisation or similarity in financial infrastructure were identified in earlier studies by Baxter
and Kouparitsas (2005), Imbs (2004) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001).
2.1 Empirical evidence
2.1.1 Relevant determinants of business cycle synchronization
While individual studies focus on many different determinants of business cycle synchronization,
there is a range of commonly recognised factors that are found to affect the comovement.
Among them, bilateral trade and trade structure have been identified as a key determinant in
most empirical studies. As documented by Anderson et al. (1999) and Calderon et al. (2007),
country pairs with more intense trade relationships have more synchronised business cycles.
As the latter study shows, the impact of trade intensity on business cycle synchronization is
smaller for developing countries than for developed countries. To further disentangle the effect
of trade on business cycle comovement, studies of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001), Burstein et al.
(2008) and Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009) address the role of trade specialisation. The
strength of the effect depends also on the type of international trade linkages used in production
(Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010).
Other determinants of business cycle synchronization that were frequently examined by
the literature include the degree of financial integration (e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013) and
transmission of monetary policy shocks (see e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Rey, 2016).
Whereas the studies mentioned investigate the effect of individual factors, Imbs (2004) provide
one of the earliest studies to consider possible determinants of business cycle synchronization
simultaneously in the context of a system of simultaneous equations. The subsequent studies
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of Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and Inklaar et al. (2008) use the approach of Leamer (1983)
to find “robust” variables explaining the comovement. These studies consider in particular
trade intensity, specialisation, financial, fiscal and monetary policy integration as common
determinants of business cycle synchronization.
2.1.2 The role of exchange rate regimes as a determinant of business cycle syn-
chronization
There is a large number of studies investigating the effect of currency unions – in particular
of the European Monetary Union (EMU) – on business cycle synchronization. The number of
studies is large enough such that Campos et al. (2018) performed a meta-analysis. The authors
analyse 63 studies on business cycle correlations between European countries. synchroniza-
tion was found to increase from about 0.4 to 0.6 following introduction of the Euro. To our
knowledge, nobody has yet extended this analysis to the role of other exchange rate regimes.
Even if the role of exchange rate regimes was not investigated as determinant of synchro-
nization, regimes were found to affect many other variables (such as international trade). If
these variables make business cycles more synchronised, we could observe an indirect channel
of exchange rate regimes on business cycles. There are many studies on the consequences of
an exchange rate regimes choice. Fixing an exchange rate was found to promote international
trade as shown by Klein and Shambaugh (2006) or Dorn and Egger (2015). Broda (2004)
shows how the real shocks (measured by changes in terms-of-trade) affect the changes in real
GDP. He finds that the real shocks are significantly smoother in floats than in pegs. Further
studies show the relevance of exchange rate regimes on other common determinants: Taylor
(2001) and Obstfeld et al. (2005) on monetary policy; Chang and Velasco (2000) on interaction
between regimes, banking system and financial stability. Other studies also consider the effect
exchange rate regimes have on economic growth, inflation and fiscal policy (e.g. Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger, 2003).
2.2 Related theoretical frameworks
There is no theory that incorporates exchange rate regimes directly as a driver of business cycle
synchronization. Nevertheless, already the Mundell-Fleming model shows how monetary and
fiscal policies affect the real economy under fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes (Fleming,
1962; Mundell, 1963). One implication of the Mundell-Fleming framework is that, given free
capital movement, the monetary policy of an economy that fixes its exchange rate regime should
be more convergent with monetary policy in the anchor country. As monetary integration has
been empirically found by earlier studies to increase business cycle synchronization, we can
also expect the latter to be higher under fixed exchange rate regime. The Mundell-Fleming
framework thus gives us one possible channel for the exchange rate regimes to affect business
cycle synchronization. Nevertheless, other defining features of exchange rate regimes such as
behaviour of foreign exchange reserves or official announcements can also play a role.
Another strand of the theoretical literature related to our topic focuses on the other de-
terminants of international business cycles. For example, Canova and Dellas (1993) provides
a general equilibrium model that analyses the contribution of trade interdependence to inter-
national business cycles. Further theoretical studies on relevant determinants of comovement
include Kehoe and Perri (2002) on frictions in international finance, Cravino and Levchenko
(2017) on the role of multinational firms or De Grauwe and Ji (2017) on the role of inter-
nationally correlated behavioural changes. We find the macroeconomic model developed by
De Grauwe and Ji (2017) to be the most relevant for our investigation. Their model studies
the transmission of shocks across countries under two cases, monetary union and monetary
independence. This framework indicates that more fixed exchange rate regimes are associated
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with more synchronised business cycles. Although the authors analyse only these two extreme
cases, they inspire us to empirically investigate different types of exchange rate regimes using
a finer classification.
The theory also suggests that exchange rate regimes have a potential to weaken or strengthen
the effects of other economic variables. We expect that the strength of this effect crucially
depends on the degree of financial openness. For example, Mundell (1973) assumes perfect
capital mobility. This can be interpreted in light of a well-known “impossible trinity” argument,
which states that an economy cannot adopt monetary independence, fixed exchange rate regime
and free capital mobility at the same time. One implication is that if we have free movement
of capital, the monetary policy of an economy in fixed exchange rate regime should be more
convergent with policy of an anchor country. For example, Obstfeld et al. (2005) argue that
monetary policy for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes is more constrained if there are
no capital controls in place. Rey (2016) argues that floating regimes are not the only necessary
condition that guarantees monetary autonomy under large capital flows. The strength of the
potential exchange rate regime effect thus depends crucially on the level of countries’ financial
openness. One can on average expect the effect of regimes to be larger if capital can move
freely across countries.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data on dependent variable
Our dependent variable of business cycle synchronization is a correlation coefficient of the
business cycle component of GDP growth data. We use either yearly or quarterly GDP growth
data for the period 1973-2016. The yearly data is retrieved from the World Bank and the
quarterly data is taken from the OECD and International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
We use the Baxter-King filter to identify the business cycle components. We use the default
filtering option which passes through the components with fluctuations between 2 and 8 years
for yearly data. The thresholds for quarterly data are 6 and 32 quarters, respectively. We use
both yearly and quarterly data since both have their own advantages: with yearly data we
have a large country coverage. Quarterly data are more often used in practice for detrending
(Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003), but such data are available mainly for the limited group of
OECD countries.
We compute the correlation of the business cycle components over 5 distinctive time inter-
vals: 1973-1983, 1982-1992, 1991-2000, 1999-2008 and 2007-2016. We include 2 years overlap
between two neighbouring intervals as a natural split in the data for two reasons. First, the
fourth interval starting in the year 1999 is intentionally chosen such that it reflects a substantial
change in the regimes structure brought by the introduction of the Euro. The fourth interval
until the year 2008 was also not affected by the global financial crisis and subsequent worldwide
declines in real GDP growth rates in the year 2009. Second, we need a sufficiently large time
span to obtain a reliable measure of correlation coefficient for each country-pair. Intervals with
the duration of at least 10 years seem to be sufficiently large to achieve this goal.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our dependent variables for each interval. The
sample of yearly data covers countries across the whole world with observations number ranging
from 12,432 in the first periods to over 31,000 in the last two periods as new countries became
independent and data for more countries became available. The mean correlation coefficient for
the business cycle synchronization was close to zero in the first three intervals but it increased
to almost 0.3 in the last two intervals. The sample of quarterly data contains substantially less
country-pairs observations since the quarterly data are reported mainly for developed countries.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the business cycle synchronization variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interval 1973-1983 1982-1992 1991-2000 1999-2008 2007-2016
Yearly Data
Mean .072 .034 .054 .284 .287
Standard Deviation .373 .357 .372 .380 .449
Observations 12,432 18,632 26,732 31,506 31,152
Quarterly Data
Mean .357 .261 .208 .678 .648
Standard Deviation .295 .341 .429 .186 .242
Observations 600 600 992 2,550 2,756
Note: Business cycle synchronization is measured by the correlation of the business cycle components
of the real GDP growth rates.
The mean correlation coefficient for the quarterly data ranges from around 0.2 to 0.7. It is
not surprising that the quarterly data show higher business cycle synchronization since the
developed countries included in the quarterly sample are likely to be more closely integrated
compared to the worldwide average.
Inklaar et al. (2008) argue that there is a possible problem with using the original correlation
data, because the error terms in a regression model are unlikely to be normally distributed.
Therefore, we follow the authors by transforming our measure of business cycle synchroniza-
tion by constructing the Fisher’s Z-transformation as C ′t =
1
2
ln(1+Ct
1−Ct ), with Ct being an original
correlation coefficient computed over each time interval t. Figure 1 displays the original and
transformed correlations of the business cycle synchronization coefficients. We can see from
the left panels in blue that both yearly and quarterly data are far from being normally dis-
tributed. In particular, the distribution for quarterly data correlations is strongly skewed due
to the large degree of integration in those countries covered by the quarterly data. The trans-
formed coefficients ensure that the distribution for both yearly and quarterly data is normally
distributed.
3.2 Data on bilateral exchange rate regimes and other variables
Our key independent variable is the bilateral de-facto exchange rate regime. Data we use is
taken from the new dataset provided by Harms and Knaze (2018)2. The main feature of the
dataset is that the data is at country-pair – bilateral – level for the cross-section dimension,
which is transformed from unilateral exchange rate regimes data, with the unilateral exchange
rate regimes data retrieved from Ilzetzki et al. (2017). The classification of the bilateral de-facto
exchange rate regimes is shown in Table A1 in Appendix A, with exchange rate regimes ranging
from least flexible (no separate legal tender including currency union) to freely floating. We
follow Harms and Knaze (2018) by defining exchange rate regime as integers ranging from 1
(least flexible) to 13 (freely floating). Unless otherwise specified, we pool them to a coarser
set of 7 dummy variables denoted Regimek with k ranging from 1 (least flexible) to 7 (freely
floating).3
2The dataset with further description is available at: https://www.international.economics.uni-mainz.
de/data-on-bilateral-exchange-rate-regimes/
3In some part of the analysis, we also test the specification by including the RegimeFF dummy that takes
a value of one if at least one country from a given country pair had a freely falling exchange rate regime at a
given period.
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Figure 1: Distribution of untransformed and transformed coefficients of business cycle
synchronization
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Note: The transformed correlation is based on the Fisher’s z-transformation function: C ′ = 12 ln(
1+C
1−C ).
The distribution is drawn from observations for the five intervals 1973-1983, 1982-1992, 1991-2000, 1999-
2008 and 2007-2016.
Another feature of the data relevant for our analysis is that we can differentiate whether
the bilateral regime between a country pair is direct or indirect. For example, Ecuador has a
no separate legal tender against US dollar, thus U.S. and Ecuador are directly linked. Another
direct US pegger (Hong Kong) is therefore indirectly pegged to Ecuador. Note that this can act
as an important instrument to address the endogeneity concern of exchange rate regimes. It is
plausible to assume that the decision of the Ecuador to peg to the U.S. dollar is independent of
the decision of Hong Kong to peg to the U.S. dollar. We can then expect that an indirect peg
of Honk Kong against Ecuador is less likely to be endogenous. We will use this information in
robustness tests in Section 5.3.4
Data on bilateral exchange rate regimes is constructed at yearly intervals. Figure 2 shows
the number of year-to-year changes in exchange rate regimes. It provides information on the
variance of our key independent variable. We can see that there have been more changes in
bilateral exchange rate regimes before 1990 and the time around 1999, when the EMU was
formed. The upper part of Figure 2 also plots the 5 intervals over which we compute the
business cycle synchronization. We use data of exchange rate regimes at the beginning (BOP)
or in the middle (MOP) of each time period. For example, for the first interval 1973-1983,
we test the results using the exchange rate regimes in the year 1973 (BOP) and year 1978
(MOP). Our analysis requires that exchange rate regime coefficients are properly measured
and the consideration of both BOP and MOP ensures that the results are not driven by within-
period variation. Given the low variability in exchange rate regimes over time, consistent results
between the BOP and MOP measures should be enough to ensure that the exchange rate regime
in a given interval is properly measured.5
4Figure A2 in Appendix A displays the distribution of de-facto regimes split by direct and indirect links.
5Another approach would be to use an average value of the exchange rate regime measure for each period.
However, taking averages would leave us with non-integer values. For example, if a country had a crawling peg
7
Figure 2: A number of year-to-year changes in the exchange rate regimes
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Figure 3: Density of the quarterly business cycle correlations split by the exchange rate
regime dummies
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
NSLT / Currency Union (1) Currency Board (2) De facto peg (3)
Crawling peg (4) Crawling band (5) Moving band (6)
Freely Floating (7) Freely Falling (ff)* Total
D
en
si
ty
* Either one or both countries in the country pair classified as "Freely Falling". Not used in benchmark.
8
Note that Harms and Knaze (2018) provide de-facto exchange rate regimes data based on
the dataset of Ilzetzki et al. (2017) as well as de-jure data based on the IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Unlike Harms and Knaze
(2018), our paper focuses on the de-facto data as we are mainly interested in the role of actually
implemented exchange rate regimes. The de-facto regimes data also has a longer time span
starting in 1973, thus having much larger sample size than the de-jure data that starts in 2000.
However, we use de-jure data for one robustness check.
Figure 3 motivates our empirical investigation: here we plot a density of the business cycle
correlation coefficients for quarterly data across different exchange rate regimes. Compared
to the overall density (box in the lower right corner), we can observe that countries with less
flexible regimes (the three boxes in the first row of Figure 3) seem to have more synchronized
business cycles than the other regimes. We shall of course be aware of the omitted variable
bias between those two variables as countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes are likely
to have other common characteristics.6
Regarding other potential determinants of business cycle synchronization, we collect an
extensive set of all variables mentioned in the previous literature, following mainly Inklaar
et al. (2008) and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005). In particular, we focus on nine groups of
determinants: (1) monetary integration; (2) trade intensity; (3) specialization; (4) similarity in
governments’ net lending / net borrowing; (5) financial integration; (6) financial infrastructure;
(7) inflation; (8) gravity variables of distance, dummy for a common colonial history and
dummies for a common border, language and religion; (9) other variables such as difference
in saving rate and physical capital. The complete data description including data sources and
indicators is reported in Table A4 in Appendix A.
3.3 Empirical specification
Our empirical strategy consists of two steps. The first step is to perform Extreme Bound Analy-
sis (EBA) to identify robust determinants from a set of potential determinants of business cycle
synchronization. EBA is a methodology based on Leamer (1985) which tests how a dependent
variable, in our case business cycle synchronization, is associated with a variety of possible
determinants of the synchronization. We use a more flexible version of the EBA introduced by
Sala-I-Martin (1997), where we look at an entire distribution of regression coefficients in line
with Inklaar et al. (2008).
For each variable of interest, the EBA consists of running n separate regression equations
specified as:
Y ′n,ijt ≡
1
2
ln
(
1 + Yn,ijt
1− Yn,ijt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fisher’s z -transformation
= αn + βnIn,ijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest
+ δnDn,ijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential
+γnZn,ijt + n,ijt, (1)
where Y ′ijt are the transformed yearly (quarterly) business cycle correlations between countries
i and j over interval t. Note that the t notation indicates the intervals, which have 5 potential
values. For each given t, the dependent variable is a correlation coefficient computed over 10 or
11 years. For simplicity, we omit the notation of ijt in the following description of the equation.
I denotes the variable of interest that is being assessed by the EBA and it is therefore always
included. Note that I ∈ X, where X is a vector of 38 potentially robust bilateral variables
between countries. Among variables of interest, our main focus is given on the exchange rate
regime variable. Dn consists of unique combinations of up to 3 variables from the set of X
(Regime 4) and later on adopted a crawling band (Regime 5).
6Please see Figure A3 in Appendix A for business cycle synchronization measured by yearly data.
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(excluding I), which differs in each of the n separate regression models. Lastly, Z denotes
variables always included in each regression model n. Our vector Z uses a full set of country
i and j fixed effects to control for any unobservable country characteristics. A variable is
considered to be EBA robust if at least 95 percent of its beta coefficients have the same sign.7
In addition, at least 90 percent of all beta coefficients must be statistically significant at the 5
percent significance level.
Having determined the EBA robust variables of business cycle synchronization, we use the
robust variables in a reduced form equation specified as:
Y ′ijt = α0 + βXijt,robust + αi + αj + εij (2)
where Xrobust denotes a vector of bilateral variables that are found to be EBA robust determi-
nants of business cycle synchronization. αi (αj) denotes source (host) country fixed effects.
8
Standard errors are clustered at country-pair level.
The main challenge of the estimation strategy is the potential endogeneity of business cycles
and exchange rate regimes. As indicated among others by Frankel and Rose (1998) following the
theory of optimal currency area (OCA) by Mundell (1961), more synchronized business cycles
increase the likelihood of two countries adopting the same currency. This is a common issue
in most studies on currency unions. However, we argue that it should be of a lesser concern
to us because we use not yearly regimes observations but only regimes at selected periods and
look at resulting correlation of business cycles. We still account for the endogeneity issue in
different ways. For example, we exclude country-pair observations containing countries whose
currencies are being frequently adopted as an anchor such as the U.S. or Germany, since the
decision on the exchange rate regime involving those countries is more likely to be endogenous,
as suggested by Barro and Tenreyro (2007).
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The extreme bound analysis (EBA)
The following section reports the results from estimating equation 1 using the EBA methodology
and reports the robust variables. We focus on reporting the EBA results for the exchange rate
regimes.9 In a first step, we construct a flexibility measure using an index ranging from 1 (least
flexible regime) to 13 (freely floating) as specified in Table A1. As Harms and Knaze (2018)
have shown, it is likely that the regimes effect is non-linear. To take this into account, in a
second step we map the measure of 13 regimes into a set of 7 coarser dummy variables. Our
variable of interest I becomes a set of six coarser regime dummies, ranging from 1 (no separate
legal tender) to 6 (managed floating) as reported in the last column of Table A1. The dummy
characterizing bilateral free floats (Regime 7) is excluded, such that the 6 dummies reflect the
differential impact of each regime on business cycle synchronization, relative to the case of free
floats.10
7Using the normally distributed cumulative distribution function being at right or left side of zero in at least
95 percent of all cases (CDF (0) test statistics > 0.95).
8In one of our robustness checks, we will later replace country-specific variables by time-variant country
fixed effects in line with Harms and Knaze (2018). Note, however, that we do not include country-pair fixed
effects since our main variable of interest — the bilateral de-facto exchange rate regime — exhibits little time
variation.
9The EBA results for other potential determinants of business cycle synchronization can be found in Table
A4 in Appendix A.
10Unless otherwise indicated, our analysis for the rest of the empirical part will focus on the effect of individual
regime dummies.
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Table 2: EBA results with selected coefficients for the exchange rate regimes
EBA 
robust?
EBA 
robust?
Bilateral de-facto ERR: BOP* (index) 100.0 %<0 100.0 %<0
Bilateral de-facto ERR: MOP* (index) 100.0 %<0 100.0 %<0
Regime 1, BOP* (NSLT / Currency union) 100.0 %>0 100.0 %>0
Regime 2, BOP* (Currency board) 79.7 %>0 96.6 %>0
Regime 3, BOP* (De facto peg) 97.3 %>0 100.0 %>0
Regime 4, BOP* (Crawling peg) 92.0 %>0 78.2 %>0
Regime 5, BOP* (Crawling band) 46.4 %>0 43.2 %<0
Regime 6, BOP* (Moving band) 100.0 %>0 100.0 %>0
* Note: BOP denotes beginning of period. MOP denotes middle of period.
Yearly data Quarterly data
Share of 
signifficant 
betas
Share of 
signifficant 
betas
Note: ∗ BOP denotes beginning of period. OP denotes middle of period. The share of significant
betas refers to the share of coefficients of corresponding exchange rate dummies being significant
among the 1781 regressions.
The first two rows in Table 2 report results for the flexibility index. A combination of the
exchange rate regimes flexibility index as a variable of interest I with up to three potentially
robust variables leads to a total of 1,781 regressions. We find that the regimes coefficient is
negative and statistically significant in all 100 percent of cases for both yearly and quarterly
GDP data, thus passing the EBA robustness test. The results are identical for both beginning
of period (BOP; row 1) and middle of period (MOP; row 2). We conclude that less flexible
regimes (having lower value on the index) are on average associated with more synchronised
business cycles. The remaining 6 rows of Table 2 show the EBA results when the exchange
rate regime dummies are used for each regime type. The large share of positive and significant
beta coefficients means that those regimes are found to have significantly more synchronised
business cycles than free floats. We find that only regime 1, regime 3 and regime 6 passed
the robustness test for both yearly and quarterly data. In addition, we find currency boards
(regime 2) to be EBA robust using quarterly data only. For yearly data we find that currency
boards have still all betas with positive signs but they are statistically significant only in 1,419
individual regressions (79.7 percent of all regressions we ran).
Figure 4 plots the average size of each beta coefficient of different exchange rate regimes
from all 1,781 regressions. We weigh each beta using the adjusted R2 of each estimation. We
perform this step to mitigate the possibility that the size of the average coefficient is driven by a
handful of estimations with low explanatory power.11 We report the yearly and quarterly data
using solid and dotted lines, respectively. The red markers denote estimations which passed
the EBA robustness test.
We can see that the coefficients for the quarterly data are always higher than for yearly
data, but display a similar pattern for individual exchange rate regimes. In particular, regime
1 (no separate legal tender) is associated with the strongest positive effect on business cycle
synchronization, with both quarterly and yearly data being EBA robust. We also find regime
3 (hard pegs) to be EBA robust, but the average size of the effect is much higher for quarterly
than for yearly data. Regime 6 (managed floating) is also strongly EBA robust but the average
size of its coefficient is only about a quarter of the effect of regime 1. Finally, the differences
in the use of a regime classification at the beginning (BOP) and middle of period (MOP) are
negligible. This is not surprising given the overall low variability in bilateral exchange rate
11Nevertheless, we find that this is not the case. The unadjusted average of coefficients shows very similar
pattern with slightly more outliers. The results are available upon request.
11
Figure 4: Average effect of the R2-weighted exchange rate regime dummy coefficients from
1,781 regressions
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of period. The coefficients show the differential impact of each individual regime on business cycle
synchronization - measured as a correlation - relative to the case of free floats.
regimes over time.
One concern in our estimation is that our results might be driven by countries with currency
crises. However, these countries are likely to be already classified as a residual “freely falling”
regimes category. The dataset contains a dummy variable RegimeFF for freely falling regimes.
This takes a value of one for each country pair where at least one country was categorized
as having a freely falling exchange rate regime by Ilzetzki et al. (2017). We repeat our EBA
test using the alternative dummies specification with the RegimeFF dummy included. The
estimation results are reported in Figure 5.
The results remain similar, with regime 1, regime 3 and regime 6 being most significant.
In addition, we find that our dummy variable RegimeFF dummy has an EBA robust negative
coefficient: country pairs where at least one country’s regime is classified as freely falling have
substantially less synchronised business cycles compared to the country pairs with free floating
regimes. This is in line with our intuition: if countries with freely falling exchange rate regime
suffer severe financial and economic crisis, then the business cycles get significantly out of
synchronization compared to countries that are currently not in crisis. The coefficient for freely
falling regimes using quarterly data is not EBA robust, which is not surprising as none but two
countries with quarterly GDP data were ever classified as having a freely falling exchange rate
regime.12
Note that results reported in Figure 5 are estimated with the freely falling regime at the
beginning of each correlation interval. However, each of our intervals has a length of at least 10
years. This might be problematic for the interpretation of empirical results if the freely falling
regime prevails only for the very short time span. For example, we might misidentify all cases
where freely falling regime occurred later than in the first interval. We find that the average
duration for countries ever classified as having the “freely falling” regime between years 1973
and 2016 is 7.3 years. This is indeed shorter than the average duration of other exchange rate
regimes. Some countries like Turkey, Uruguay, Argentina or Brazil were in this category for
12Specifically, for quarterly data we have only 126 country-pair observations with RegimeFF dummy being
equal to one at the beginning of each period from a full sample of approximately 5000 observations for quarterly
data. These observations come from a freely falling regimes being in place in Iceland and Brazil. There are no
observations falling into the freely falling category for quarterly data when exchange rate regimes at the middle
of period is taken.
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Figure 5: Average effect of the R2-weighted exchange rate regime dummy coefficients from
1,781 regressions: with “Freely Falling Regime (FF)” included
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Figure 6: Average effect of the R2-weighted exchange rate regime dummy coefficients from
1,781 regressions: Sample split by the degree of financial openness
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Note: Red markers denote EBA robust coefficients.
more than 20 years, but most other countries were in this category for significantly shorter time
spans. Thus, the “freely falling” regimes coefficients might be biased.
However, this should not affect our results if the exchange rate regime dummies of primary
interest (Regimes 1 to 6) remain stable. This is indeed the case as can be seen in Figure 5.
This is also the case when we perform further robustness tests by excluding countries that were
classified as freely floating during any given correlation interval or (even more restrictively) in
any year between the 1973 and 2016.13 Moving on, we treat the “freely falling” regime as a
special category used for robustness checks, also because this classification does not fit well into
our bilateral structure when only one country within a country pair was classified as a freely
falling regime.
Following the discussion on the Mundellian trilemma, we are also concerned about the
extent to which regimes interact with countries’ levels of financial openness. To account for the
importance of capital flows, we do a sample split using a measure of financial openness as in
Chinn and Ito (2006). We compute an average of the unilateral measure of financial account
openness of each county pair at the beginning of each period. The yearly data for dependent
13See Section 5 for extensions and robustness tests.
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variable is used.14 The results reported in Figure 6 show that regimes matter only for country
pairs with an open financial account: all regimes except regime 4 and regime 5 are EBA robust.
Also, note that the regime 2 (currency boards) that previously failed the EBA robustness test
when using the yearly data is now EBA robust as well. We find no robust regimes for countries
with a closed financial account.
We proceed with the EBA on all other potential determinants of synchronization. The
complete EBA results for all 38 doubtful variables are reported in Table A4 in Appendix
A. The robust determinants identified by EBA are very similar to the determinants found
by Inklaar et al. (2008). In addition to those determinants found by Inklaar et al. (2008), the
correlation of CPI based inflation rates and average trade openness are also robust determinants
of synchronization. We take all EBA robust variables and use them in estimating our reduced
model as outlined in equation 2.
4.2 Benchmark estimation of the reduced model
Estimation of the reduced model specified in equation 2 is shown in Table 3. Following the EBA
exercise, a vectorXijt,robust consists of all EBA robust variables including exchange rate regime
dummies. These variables include measures for trade intensity (principal component), trade
specialization (share of intra-industry trade), fiscal integration, inflation correlation and average
trade openness. Note that we report the standardized coefficients of non-dummy explanatory
variables to make the individual coefficients comparable.15.
Table 3 shows that all standardized coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically
significant. The sample size for yearly data (column 1) is much larger than for quarterly data
(column 2), but the size of the standardized coefficients is very similar, further supporting
the robustness of our results. The size of the standardized coefficients is also in line with the
previous literature. For example, the coefficient for fiscal integration is identical to the findings
of Inklaar et al. (2008). The coefficient of trade intensity (bilateral trade) is slightly lower
(0.02-0.03) compared to Inklaar et al. (2008), which seems to be driven by the fact that we are
also including a measure of aggregate trade (openness).
Turning to our main coefficients of interest, it can be see in column (1) that coefficients for
no separate legal tenders (Regime 1) and de-facto pegs (Regime 3) are positive and strongly
statistically significant. As for other soft pegs, only moving bands (Regime 6) are statistically
significant. We find that no separate legal tender (Regime 1) has by far the strongest effect on
business cycle synchronization compared to the free floating pairs. The size of the effect for
regime 3 is only about half as large compared to regime 1. The size of the effect for regime 6
is only about one fourth of the regime 1.
Comparing yearly to quarterly data (column 2), the results turn out to be very consistent.
However, the size of the coefficients is always larger when using quarterly data.16. Finally,
taking the regimes at the middle of the period (see columns 3 and 4) yields very similar results,
which is not surprising to us given the low variability in exchange rate regimes over time. Note
that currency boards (Regime 2) are significant only for columns (2)-(4) but not for yearly data
in column (1). We will show in section 5.2 that the currency boards coefficient is significant
only for financially open countries.
We find that the results for exchange rate regimes – especially for hard pegs – are also
14The reason is that quarterly data consists of mostly developed countries that all have a relatively high
degree of financial openness.
15We standardize each variable xijt by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation such that
xstdijt =
[xijt–mean(xijt)]
sd(xijt)
. Note that dummies for exchange rate regimes are not standardized.
16For completeness, please see Table B2 in Appendix B for the results when observations of ”Free Falling”
regime is included.
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Table 3: Effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization: Benchmark results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of period Middle of period
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Bilateral Trade (PCA, standardized) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(6.398) (5.417) (6.386) (6.398)
Specialization (standardized) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(11.375) (5.833) (10.836) (4.283)
Fiscal integration (standardized) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(21.368) (9.171) (24.275) (11.450)
Inflation correlation (standardized) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.002
(12.337) (4.266) (6.657) (0.176)
Openness (standardized) 0.348∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(33.648) (14.540) (35.406) (17.678)
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(7.229) (8.068) (7.970) (6.155)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.022 0.100∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(1.134) (2.334) (2.320) (2.089)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(2.888) (4.451) (2.929) (8.542)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.139∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.021) (0.359) (2.998)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) -0.009 -0.014 -0.025∗∗ -0.028
(-1.013) (-0.615) (-2.511) (-0.885)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.032∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(3.728) (1.718) (5.585) (2.721)
N 29634 5000 32073 5198
R2 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.40
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-pair
level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported. Business cycle synchronization
is a dependent variable.
economically significant. We see this by re-estimating our benchmark results with the untrans-
formed dependent variable instead of using the Fisher’s Z-transformation. This specification is
easier for interpretation, since the correlation coefficients after the transformation do not range
from -1 to 1. For example, we find that the estimated coefficient of regime 1 (NSLT / Currency
union) ranges from 0.07 to 0.12, implying that regime 1 increases business cycle correlation by
0.07-0.12, compared to the free floating regimes. We report the complete results when using
the untransformed dependent variable in Table B1 in Appendix B.17
4.3 Focus on the special case of currency unions
The bilateral dataset defines the “no separate legal tender” (NSLT, Regime 1) category as a)
countries where a foreign currency circulates as the sole legal tender (frequently also referred to
as “dollarization”) and b) countries that belong to a monetary or currency union in which the
same legal tender is shared by members of the union (Harms and Knaze, 2018). To facilitate the
comparison with numerous studies on the effect of currency unions, we split the NSLT category
into country pairs within the EMU and pairs that are NSLT but outside of the EMU. The reason
is that EMU can be considered as the only currency union that conducts monetary policy based
17We note a difficulty in comparing the strength of the effects between individual determinants: the dummy
coefficients for exchange rate regimes are non-standardized, whereas the other variables have standardized
coefficients. Despite the standardization, bilateral variables constructed as bilateral correlations such as trade
specialisation are difficult to compare with aggregate measures such as trade openness. Therefore, our paper
focuses on the relative importance between individual exchange rate regimes for business cycles synchronization.
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Table 4: Effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization: Split of Regime 1
into currency unions (EMU) and no separate legal tenders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of period Middle of period
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Currency union (EMU) 0.313∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(10.307) (8.068) (10.128) (6.155)
Other no separate legal tender 0.034∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(2.122) (2.625)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.022 0.100∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(1.104) (2.334) (2.349) (2.089)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(2.876) (4.451) (2.938) (8.542)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.139∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.021) (0.270) (2.998)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) -0.008 -0.014 -0.025∗∗ -0.028
(-0.917) (-0.615) (-2.515) (-0.885)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(3.875) (1.718) (5.648) (2.721)
N 29634 5000 32073 5198
R2 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.40
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported. Other explanatory variables
from vector Xijt,robust included but not reported.
on criteria for the union as a whole. Other currency unions are only implicitly pegging against
other currencies. For example, West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) or
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) are pegged against the Euro
(before French Franc) and Eastern Carribean Currency Union is pegged against the US dollar.
Table 4 reports the results when the EMU dummy is separated. We can see that both
coefficients remain positive and statistically significant, but the coefficient of currency union
(0.313, row 1 in column 1) is much higher than for other “dollarized” (NSLT) countries without
Eurozone (0.034, row 2 in column 1). This implies that the Eurozone membership is associated
with an increase in business cycle synchronization by almost ten times as much compared to the
other NSLT countries. Therefore, the role of a common central bank with a monetary policy
conducted across all member states seems to be of a particular importance. Further, we can
see from column 2 (quarterly data) that the EMU category is almost identical to the coefficient
for regime 1 in Table 3, since all countries with available quarterly data are members of the
EMU. This partially explains the difference observed between yearly and quarterly coefficients
in the previous table.
5 Extensions and Robustness Tests
5.1 Additional controls for time trend
Our benchmark estimation includes country i and j fixed effects. The use of standard country-
year fixed effects is not possible as our dependent variable is constructed as a correlation over
multiple years. We believe that the time-varying unobserved heterogeneity is not an issue to
us since we consider 5 very distinctive intervals over long time spans. Nevertheless, to test this
possibility we also include country-time fixed effects to account for unobservable country-time
varying heterogeneity.
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Table 5: Controlling for the time-varying heterogeneity using country-time fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of period Middle of period
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(3.587) (5.261) (5.171) (7.537)
Regime 2 (Currency board) -0.009 0.050 0.020 0.090∗∗∗
(-0.500) (1.541) (1.225) (3.236)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(3.318) (5.758) (5.760) (10.657)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.027∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(2.340) (3.620) (2.975) (3.903)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(5.467) (1.878) (7.744) (2.554)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(4.021) (2.516) (4.390) (5.750)
N 29634 5000 32073 5198
R2 0.62 0.67 0.61 0.69
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Country i-time and country j-time fixed effects included but not reported. Other explanatory
variables from vector Xijt,robust included but not reported. Business cycle synchronization is the dependent
variable.
Table 5 reports the results. We can see that the coefficients are higher for most regimes
than in our benchmark results, except for regime 2. Also, regime 4 and regime 5 now are shown
to significantly affect synchronization, which has not been the case before. We note that the
size of the coefficients for each regime generally falls as the regimes become more flexible. Our
results also remain robust when country i, country j and time t fixed effects are controlled (i.e.
no country-time dummies but separate time dummies) and when bilateral gravity variables are
added to the specification.18
5.2 Accounting for the role of financial openness and institutional
quality
Our next robustness check consists of splitting the sample by a degree of financial openness
based on Chinn and Ito (2006) and by institutional quality as measured by the World Gover-
nance Indicators from the World Bank. The intuition to consider financial openness is that the
relationship between regimes and monetary autonomy exists only when there is a free movement
of capital. The relationship between regimes and synchronization might be stronger when the
financial account is open. Moreover, a more open financial account should allow the exchange
rate regime to play a larger role in the real economy. An intuition to consider the institutional
quality is that countries with high quality governance are expected to perform better at main-
taining exchange rate pegs and abandon them less often, as suggested by Alesina and Wagner
(2006). Even if a country is committed to a credible exchange rate regime, poor institutional
quality is expected to impose more challenges to implement and maintain its policy targets.
The first two columns of Table 6 confirm the EBA results presented in Figure 6, which
show that exchange rate regime is a significant determinant of synchronization only if finan-
cial account is relatively open.19 In contrast to EBA, our reduced model also shows positive
18Table B3 in Appendix B reports regression results when country i, country j and time t fixed effects are
controlled. Table B4 in Appendix B adds bilateral gravity variables.
19We perform the sample split by defining a threshold of 0.5 in the range 0 to 1, where countries with an
index of 0.5 or higher are understood as having an open financial account.
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Table 6: The sample split by the levels of financial openness and institutional quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness Governance quality
High Low High Low
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.128∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(7.368) (3.660) (7.306) (3.335)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.052∗∗ -0.047 0.027 -0.000
(2.350) (-1.160) (1.329) (-0.009)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.077∗∗∗ 0.004 0.080∗∗∗ 0.023
(3.280) (0.118) (3.401) (0.649)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.005 0.011 0.019 -0.017
(0.322) (0.574) (1.046) (-0.889)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) 0.002 -0.039∗∗ -0.018 -0.025
(0.216) (-2.499) (-1.496) (-1.613)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 0.031∗∗∗ 0.012
(4.386) (0.552) (2.709) (0.767)
N 20936 8374 17490 12144
R2 0.50 0.39 0.50 0.42
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported. Other explanatory variables
from vector Xijt,robust included but not reported. Note: Institutional quality is represented by the world
governance index (WGI). Yearly data is used for this table. Exchange rate regime at the beginning of each
period is used. Business cycle synchronization is the dependent variable.
and significant effect of regime 1 for countries with closed financial account, even though the
coefficient is lower than for countries with an open financial account. The last two columns of
Table 6 show that the effect of the regimes on synchronization is higher and more significant
for countries with higher institution quality.
5.3 Exclusion of observations with possibly endogenous exchange
rate regimes and the “freely falling” cases
The concern that an exchange rate regime is not exogenous to the outcome variable under study
has been frequently raised in the literature. For example, Klein and Shambaugh (2006) note
that the frequent variables of interest such as inflation or economic growth are both determined
by the peg and determine the likelihood to peg. However, the authors argue that the choice
to peg is largely related to variables that only change slowly, such that the use of country
or country-pair fixed effects seems to address adequately concerns with endogeneity. We also
believe that our dependent variable is less prone to the endogeneity problem than variables
such as inflation, because it is constructed as a correlation over five independent periods with
relatively long time horizon. Nevertheless, to rule out this possibility, we use three rather strict
criteria for excluding potentially endogenous exchange rate regimes observations.
The first approach borrows the intuition from Barro and Tenreyro (2007), where the authors
propose an approach to address the problem that the decision on exchange rate regime might be
endogenous to other macroeconomic variables such as trade, inflation or real GDP co-movement.
The intuition runs as follows: suppose that both a country A and a country B peg their currency
to an anchor currency of country C. If both countries A and B decide independently to keep a
close parity with country C’s currency, the exchange rate regime between countries A and B
would be exogenous to the bilateral trade, co-movement of business cycles or other economic
variables between these two countries. Therefore, exchange rate regime that is only indirectly
linked between countries A and B is assumed to be exogenous. This might not be the case for
the exchange rate regimes of countries A and B directly pegged to the anchor C.
This feature can be easily applied to the bilateral exchange rate regimes dataset. We have
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Table 7: Exclusion of observations that are prone to endogeneity problem
(3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2)
Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Direct Links Direct Links 6 Anchors 6 Anchors Regime 1 Regime 1
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.174∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(6.507) (5.525) (6.296) (3.123)
Regime 2 (Currency board) -0.015 -0.029 0.015 -0.012 0.026 -0.004
(-0.603) (-1.195) (0.710) (-0.620) (1.311) (-0.189)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.032 0.046∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(1.390) (2.176) (2.182) (2.297) (3.089) (3.514)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) -0.014 0.013 0.010 0.026∗∗ 0.010 0.033∗∗∗
(-1.095) (1.104) (0.783) (2.126) (0.821) (2.825)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) -0.028∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.001 0.046∗∗∗ -0.004 0.050∗∗∗
(-3.077) (4.138) (-0.132) (5.281) (-0.471) (5.944)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.015 0.030∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(1.612) (3.261) (3.671) (4.742) (4.140) (4.422)
Country Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country-Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations (N) 27476 27476 25556 25556 28572 28572
R2 0.45 0.61 0.47 0.61 0.46 0.62
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Other explanatory variables from vector Xijt,robust included but not reported. Note: Yearly
data is used for this table. Business cycle synchronization is the dependent variable.
data on country pairs that have both directly as well as indirectly linked exchange rate regimes.20
Directly linked exchange rate regimes consist of connections when a given country adopts the
currency of a main anchor country in a “client-anchor” relationship (f.e. Hong-Kong - U.S.),
a currency union relationship (f.e. Germany-France) or a “client-currency union” relationship
(f.e. Denmark-Eurozone). Indirect link dummies distinguishes country pairs that are connected
indirectly through common anchor currency as “anchor-anchor” (f.e. Honk-Kong - Jordan) and
pairs that are both pegged to a currency union as “anchor-currency union” (f.e. Denmark and
Bulgaria). We use the argument of Barro and Tenreyro (2007) that the directly linked regimes
are more likely to be endogenous and exclude all such observations from the sample.
The results are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. We see that the effect of regime
1 is almost identical for both country and country-pair fixed effects. Thus, even if all “client-
anchor”, “client-currency union” observations are excluded the results remain very robust. As
for regimes 3 and 6, those regimes remain significant only for country-time fixed effects, which
could be driven by the fact that we strongly reduce the number of available observations.21 An
unexpected result shows up for regime 5, when country fixed effects are controlled for. The
negatively significant result indicates that country pairs in crawling band have lower synchro-
nization than the freely floating regimes. However, the coefficient turns out to be positive and
significant once the country-time fixed effects are used. Combined with the fact that regime
5 was not EBA significant, we tend not to make any inference on the effect of this regime on
business cycle synchronization.
In line with the same intuition, the second approach is to exclude observations for countries
that are frequently identified as main anchor currencies. The countries identified as major
anchor currencies as in by Barro and Tenreyro (2007) are Australia, France, Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the United States. We exclude all observations where at least one
country from the country-pair belongs to this list. Excluding these countries should eliminate
the observations that are most likely to suffer from endogeneity.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show results when excluding observations involving these 6
20See Figure A1 in Appendix B.
21Note that from cca. 27.000 observations available, the large majority are the freely floating regimes.
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Table 8: Excluding observations classified as freely falling or in crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Freely falling Freely falling Banking crises Currency crises Debt crises
(in period) (all periods) (in period) (in period) (in period)
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.128∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(7.647) (6.896) (5.959) (6.470) (7.180)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.020 0.035 0.025 0.021 0.029
(0.871) (1.267) (1.128) (1.036) (1.422)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.062∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(2.576) (3.249) (2.571) (3.346) (2.492)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.018 0.022 0.031∗∗ 0.013 0.014
(1.316) (1.204) (2.256) (1.030) (1.130)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) -0.025∗∗ -0.034∗∗ 0.002 -0.004 -0.013
(-2.221) (-2.255) (0.217) (-0.367) (-1.411)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.018∗ 0.012 0.038∗∗∗
(4.421) (4.903) (-1.759) (1.342) (4.189)
Observations (N) 19620 12824 20348 24524 27548
R2 0.51 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.48
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported. Other explanatory variables
from vector Xijt,robust included but not reported. Note: Yearly data is used for this table.
countries. The positive effect of regimes 1, 3 and 6 is robust in both specifications. In addition,
regime 5 shows a significantly positive effect on synchronization when we control for country-
time fixed effects. Finally, the third approach is to exclude all observations for regime 1 (No
separate legal tenders / currency unions) as they are likely to be subject to the endogeneity
issue as well. The results are shown in the last two columns of Table 7. We can see that the
results with regime 1 excluded are very similar to our benchmark results.
An additional issue we consider is the occurrence of short-lived exchange rate regimes in
any given interval. This is especially the case for the “freely falling” residual category. This
could be especially problematic if the regime went from peg to freely falling at any point in
time other than the beginning of period (BOP) or the middle of period (MOP). To check for
this possibility, Table 8 reports the results when excluding “freely falling” observations even
if they were not classified as such at the BOP or MOP. Column 1 excludes observations that
had a freely falling regime at any year over a given interval, even if this was in the last year.
Column 2 is even more strict such that it excludes observations if they were classified as freely
falling at any point in history starting from the year 1973.
These exclusions greatly reduce the number of observations available. Nevertheless, the
robustness of the results for regimes 1, 3 and 6 remains. Similarly to the previous table, the non-
EBA robust regime 5 turns out to be negative, with the coefficient being barely economically
significant. Further, there remains a possibility that an exchange rate regime was not classified
as “freely falling” but a country experienced serious banking, currency and debt crises. We
control for this possibility by excluding countries that experienced a crisis during our correlation
period as specified in Laeven and Valencia (2012). The results are reported in columns 3 to 5
of Table 8. We find that even this exclusion does not significantly alter our results.
5.4 Robustness across samples, periods and regime classifications
Finally, we re-estimate the effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization
by excluding observations whenever at least one country in a country pair belonged to either:
(1) oil-exporting countries with a membership in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC); (2) countries with a population of less than 1 million; (3) tax havens as
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Table 9: Exclusion of the selected country groups from the sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
OPEC Small Countries Tax Heavens Latin America
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.126∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(6.901) (6.032) (6.798) (6.669)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.001 0.006 0.016 0.015
(0.055) (0.214) (0.657) (0.740)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(3.190) (3.278) (2.636) (3.095)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.025∗ 0.003 0.011 0.011
(1.680) (0.218) (0.798) (0.832)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) -0.017∗ -0.002 0.005 0.017∗
(-1.708) (-0.174) (0.572) (1.753)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.015 0.021∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(3.790) (1.558) (2.239) (3.064)
N 22038 22744 24442 23301
R2 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported. Other explanatory variables
from vector Xijt,robust included but not reported. Note: Yearly data is used for this table.
classified by the OECD and (4) Latin America countries. We exclude these groups due to their
country-specific characteristics that might potentially bias our results. For example, countries
in Latin America are excluded as those have been subject to multiple economic or financial
crises in recent history. It can be seen from Table 9 that our results remain very robust to our
benchmark and do not appear to be driven by any particular country group. Lastly, we confirm
that our results are not driven by any specific time period22 or by the de-jure versus de-facto
dichotomy in regimes classification.23
6 Conclusion
The use of a new dataset on bilateral exchange rate regimes allows us to move beyond the
special case of currency unions and test the effect of various exchange rate regimes on busi-
ness cycle synchronization. We find that currency unions increase the co-movement of business
cycles, which is consistent with the previous literature. The point estimate from our analy-
sis measuring business cycle correlation indicates that – compared to pairs with free floating
regimes – countries with no separate legal tenders have more synchronised business cycles by
around 0.12 points. This effect is particularly strong for countries within a currency union, as
compared to countries with foreign currency as their sole legal tender.
The effect of other exchange rate regimes has not been previously tested empirically. We find
that country pairs with other less flexible regimes have more synchronised business cycles. The
effect remains positive and significant for both currency boards as well as de-facto pegs. The
effect is much stronger for countries with high financial openness. In particular, currency boards
are found to lead to more synchronised business cycles only for financially opened countries.
The effect of soft pegs is more heterogeneous - with the coefficient not always linearly decreasing
with the increasing exchange rate flexibility - such that we must be careful in differentiating
between the effects of individual soft pegs. Overall, we find no exchange rate regimes with less
synchronised business cycles than free floats, at least as long as countries do not experience a
severe financial crisis.
22See Table B5 in Appendix B for split according to periods.
23See Table B6 in Appendix B for a comparison of coefficients.
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Appendix A: Description of the Data
Table A1: De-facto exchange rate regimes mapping
De-facto exchange rate regimes
Exchange rate 
flexibility 
(index)
Exchange 
rate regime
Hard pegs
No separate legal tender or currency union 1 Regime1
Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 2 Regime2
Soft pegs
Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% * 3 -
De facto peg 4 Regime3
Pre announced crawling peg; de facto moving band narrower than or equal to +/-1% 5 Regime4
Pre announced crawling band / 
de facto horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
6 Regime4
De facto crawling peg 7 Regime4
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 8 Regime5
Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 9 Regime5
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 10 Regime5
Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 11 Regime6
De facto moving band +/-5%/ Managed floating 12 Regime6
Freely floating 13 Regime7
Freely falling ** - RegimeFF
Dual market in which parallel market data is missing ** - -
Floating arrangements
Residuals
*  We do not include the category "Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%" in our specification as 
we had no observations for this regime in our sample. 
** Residuals 'Freely falling' and 'Dual market in which parallel makret data is missing' were dropped in the index. 
Note: Table is based on Table A1 from Harms and Knaze (2018).
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Figure A1: Example of the bilateral structure of the data
Note: Information on countries’ anchor currencies is used to identify country-pairs’ exchange rate
regimes. For example, taking South African Rand (ZAR) pegged to U.S. dollar and Bulgarian Lev
pegged to the Euro, South Africa rand is classified as floating to Bulgarian Lev since U.S. dollar is
agains the Euro. Continuing with the example above, South African Rand is connected to the U.S.
with a direct link (yellow dot in Figure A1). Since Ecuador is having no separate legal tender to the
U.S. dollar, it has a direct link to the U.S. and at the same time an indirect link against South Africa
(red dot in Figure A1).
Figure A2: Density distribution of exchange rate regimes with direct and indirect connections
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Figure A3: Density of the yearly business cycle correlations split by bilateral exchange rate
regime dummies
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Figure A4: Variables used in the EBA to choose the EBA robust variables
Variable Source
Bilateral de-facto exchange rate regime (index), BOP* yes
Bilateral de-facto exchange rate regime (index), MOP* yes
Bilateral de-jure exchange rate regime (index), BOP* yes
Bilateral de-jure exchange rate regime (index), MOP* yearly only
Nominal Interest rate correlations: Deposit Rate yes
Nominal Interest rate corr.: Government Bond Yield yes
Nominal Interest rate corr.: Treasury Bill Rate yes
Nominal Interest Rate corr.: Central Bank Policy Rate yes
Real Interest rate corr.: Deposit Rate yes
Real Interest rate corr.: Government Bond Yield yes
Real Interest rate corr.: Treasury Bill Rate yes
Real Interest Rate corr.: Central Bank Policy Rate yes
Bilateral pairs within the EMU (dummy) yes
Exchange rate variability (mean of monthly changes) yes
Exchange rate variability (squared) yes
Ratio of bilateral trade to the sum of total trade yes
Ratio of bilateral trade to the sum of GDP yes
Maximum of trade intensity yes
Principal component analysis of the previous variables yes
Export similarity between two countries (abs): extent of trade in similar 
goods in the same industry
quarterly
Export similarity between two countries (square) yes
Share of intra-industrial trade yes
Yearly correlations in general government net lending / borrowing 
(percent of GDP)
IMF: WEO. Link: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo
/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx
yes
Difference in FI (abs, private credit by money banks to % of GDP/stock 
mkt capitalization to % of GDP)
quarterly
Difference in FI (abs, private credit by deposit banks to % of GDP/stock 
mkt capitalization to % of GDP)
quarterly
Difference in FI (sqr, private credit by money banks to % of GDP/stock 
mkt capitalization to % of GDP)
no
Difference in FI (sqr, private credit by deposit banks to % of GDP/stock 
mkt capitalization to % of GDP)
no
Difference in the net foreign assets positions  (NFA/GDP) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007 no
Overall capital inflows restrictions correlations
IMF: AREAER. Link: https://www.elibrary-
areaer.imf.org
no
Overall capital restrictions index correlations
Fernández, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler and 
Uribe (2016)
no
Correlation of CPI based inflation rates yes
Standard deviation of inflation rates differences between two countries
quartely
Absolute difference in capital stock per person between country pairs in 
constant 2011 USD
Penn World Table version 9.0. Link:  
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/
quarterly
Trade openness yes
Difference in oil import share (absolute diff or squared) quarterly
Difference in oil import share (squared diff of square) quarterly
Difference in saving rate (absolute diff or squared) no
Difference in saving rate (squared diff)
no
World Bank, WITS: 
https://wits.worldbank.org/
EBA robust? 
1. Monetary integration
Harms and Knaze (2018), link: 
https://www.international.economics.uni-
mainz.de/data-on-bilateral-exchange-rate-
regimes/
IMF: International Financial Statistics. Link: 
http://data.imf.org/IFS
2. Trade intensity
* Note: BOP denotes "Beginning of the period" and stands for the first year of the respective period. MOP denotes "Middle of the period" and stands for 
the median year of the respective period. 
3. Specialization
World Bank, WITS: 
https://wits.worldbank.org/
4.  Similarity of fiscal policies
5. Financial infrastructure
World Bank: World Development Indicators
OECD. Link: 
https://data.oecd.org/natincome/saving-
rate.htm
World Bank: World Development Indicators. 
Link: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/
world-development-indicators
6. Financial integration
7. Inflation
IMF: International Financial Statistics. Link: 
http://data.imf.org/IFS
8. Others
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Appendix B: Additional Estimation Results
Table B1: Effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization as an
untransformed dependent variable without the Fisher’s-Z transformation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of period Middle of period
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Bilateral Trade (PCA, standardized) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(6.984) (2.325) (6.745) (3.476)
Specialization (standardized) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(9.465) (5.915) (9.221) (4.382)
Fiscal integration (standardized) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(19.391) (9.729) (22.758) (12.353)
Inflation correlation (standardized) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002
(10.631) (3.847) (5.298) (0.311)
Openness (standardized) 0.238∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗
(31.614) (14.522) (33.418) (17.062)
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.069∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(7.007) (7.655) (8.035) (4.862)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.019 0.056∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(1.626) (2.569) (2.865) (2.078)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(3.094) (5.796) (2.591) (9.484)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.006 -0.027 0.004 0.091∗∗∗
(0.701) (-0.943) (0.464) (3.194)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) 0.002 -0.004 -0.017∗∗ -0.024
(0.383) (-0.262) (-2.365) (-1.200)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(3.892) (2.585) (5.651) (2.583)
N 29634 5000 32073 5198
R2 0.46 0.39 0.42 0.37
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported. The transformation does
not have any effect on the significance of individual coefficients.
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Table B2: The effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization: with “Freely
falling” regimes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of period Middle of period
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Bilateral Trade (PCA, standardized) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(6.485) (5.295) (6.539) (6.398)
Specialization (standardized) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(10.965) (5.744) (10.202) (4.283)
Fiscal integration (standardized) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(23.822) (10.299) (24.370) (11.450)
Inflation correlation (standardized) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.002
(10.564) (4.752) (7.452) (0.176)
Openness (standardized) 0.345∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗
(34.994) (14.806) (37.004) (17.678)
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.118∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(7.510) (8.237) (7.715) (6.155)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.042∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(2.143) (2.502) (2.940) (2.089)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.055∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(2.814) (4.609) (3.433) (8.542)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.005 0.010 -0.000 0.139∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.195) (-0.029) (2.998)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) -0.000 0.005 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.028
(-0.010) (0.209) (-2.643) (-0.885)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(2.885) (2.652) (5.286) (2.721)
Regime ff (Freely falling) -0.085∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.207∗∗∗ 0.000
(-6.733) (0.543) (-13.292) (.)
N 32722 5126 33703 5198
R2 0.45 0.41 0.43 0.40
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at country-
pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported.
Table B3: Effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization: Benchmark with
country and period fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of period Middle of period
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.050∗∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(3.067) (1.704) (4.456) (3.756)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.008 0.030 0.027 0.068∗∗
(0.397) (0.839) (1.616) (2.188)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(3.696) (5.140) (5.971) (11.826)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.011 0.054 0.025∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.973) (1.305) (2.347) (3.402)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) 0.032∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(3.880) (2.288) (4.645) (3.102)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.021 0.042∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(4.112) (1.311) (4.756) (3.934)
N 29634 5000 32073 5198
R2 0.52 0.56 0.49 0.57
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered
at country-pair level. Country i, country j and period t fixed effects included but not
reported. Other explanatory variables from vector Xijt,robust included but not reported.
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Table B4: Effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization: Gravity
variables included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of period Middle of period
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Bilateral Trade (PCA, standardized) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(5.349) (4.679) (5.336) (4.821)
Specialization (standardized) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.011∗
(11.121) (3.312) (10.724) (1.711)
Fiscal integration (standardized) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(12.674) (5.686) (14.381) (6.646)
Inflation correlation (standardized) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(10.666) (6.993) (7.520) (5.751)
Openness (standardized) 0.083 -2.061∗∗∗ 0.129 -2.081∗∗∗
(0.732) (-3.555) (1.129) (-3.722)
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.027∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(1.673) (3.171) (3.083) (4.726)
Regime 2 (Currency board) -0.031∗ -0.010 -0.001 0.030
(-1.675) (-0.289) (-0.031) (1.019)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.048∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(2.571) (4.554) (4.493) (8.766)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.017 0.110∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(1.479) (2.737) (2.030) (2.781)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) 0.037∗∗∗ -0.004 0.064∗∗∗ 0.034
(4.408) (-0.204) (6.617) (1.073)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.021∗∗ -0.001 0.024∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(2.430) (-0.066) (2.803) (3.361)
Distance -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(-5.689) (-3.747) (-5.284) (-2.625)
Common border 0.033 -0.020 0.033 -0.029
(1.502) (-0.571) (1.608) (-0.785)
Common language 0.033∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(3.569) (3.919) (4.312) (3.597)
Colony -0.086∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.043
(-5.025) (-2.278) (-5.465) (-1.419)
Religion 0.053∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(7.307) (6.299) (7.200) (5.362)
N 28541 4824 30938 5020
R2 0.62 0.68 0.61 0.70
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered
at country-pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table B5: Effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization across time
periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period Period Period Period
[1,4] [1,3] [3,5] [4,5]
Bilateral Trade (PCA, standardized) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(6.434) (7.587) (6.152) (5.566)
Specialization (standardized) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(9.750) (7.621) (11.807) (11.539)
Fiscal integration (standardized) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(12.827) (5.508) (19.997) (11.405)
Inflation correlation (standardized) 0.011∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(2.489) (6.900) (11.917) (9.790)
Openness (standardized) 0.660∗∗∗ -0.007 0.334∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(34.942) (-0.093) (31.915) (4.082)
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.096∗∗∗ 0.046 0.102∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(4.876) (0.886) (6.524) (3.732)
Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.031 -0.073 0.012 -0.011
(1.428) (-1.209) (0.638) (-0.602)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.108∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.035
(4.687) (4.169) (2.703) (1.644)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) -0.012 -0.016 0.017 0.021∗
(-0.762) (-0.550) (1.449) (1.704)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) -0.008 0.096∗∗∗ -0.003 0.022∗∗
(-0.876) (6.029) (-0.293) (2.376)
Regime 6 (Moving band) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -0.001
(2.989) (3.036) (5.237) (-0.153)
N 15784 5578 28736 24056
R2 0.45 0.27 0.48 0.56
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered
at country-pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table B6: Effect of exchange rate regimes on business cycle synchronization: De-jure versus
de-facto regimes for periods 4 and 5 only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
De-facto regimes De-jure regimes
Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly
Bilateral Trade (PCA, standardized) 0.029∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(5.566) (7.010) (5.240) (7.025)
Specialization (standardized) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.011∗
(11.539) (2.187) (12.684) (1.858)
Fiscal integration (standardized) 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(11.405) (5.084) (13.786) (5.525)
Inflation correlation (standardized) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(9.790) (6.378) (8.680) (6.471)
Openness (standardized) 0.051∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(4.082) (-4.708) (2.168) (-5.250)
Regime 1 (NSLT / Currency union) 0.061∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(3.732) (5.720)
Regime 2 (Currency board) -0.011 0.048
(-0.602) (1.456)
Regime 3 (De facto peg) 0.035 0.193∗∗∗
(1.644) (3.750)
Regime 4 (Crawling peg) 0.021∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(1.704) (4.747)
Regime 5 (Crawling band) 0.022∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(2.376) (2.997)
Regime 6 (Moving band) -0.001 0.031∗∗
(-0.153) (1.961)
De-jure Regime 1 (NSLT / Curerncy union) 0.232∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(9.495) (4.702)
De-jure Regime 2 (Currency board) 0.020 -0.044
(0.856) (-1.274)
De-jure Regime 3 (Conventional peg) -0.014 0.154∗∗∗
(-1.100) (3.331)
De-jure Regime 4 (Stabilized and crawling) -0.036∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(-1.738) (-3.512)
De-jure Regime 5 (Horizontal bands and other managed) 0.103∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(5.396) (6.218)
De-jure Regime 6 (Managed floating) 0.047∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(5.876) (3.072)
N 24056 3962 24762 4054
R2 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.49
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered
at country-pair level. Country i and country j fixed effects included but not reported.
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